Contextual Epistemic Logic by Rebuschi, Manuel & Lihoreau, Franck
ar
X
iv
:0
90
1.
14
52
v1
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
11
 Ja
n 2
00
9
Contextual Epistemic Logic
Manuel Rebuschi
L.H.S.P. – Archives H. Poincare´
Universite´ Nancy 2
manuel.rebuschi@univ-nancy2.fr
Franck Lihoreau
Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
franck.lihoreau@fcsh.unl.pt
Abstract
One of the highlights of recent informal epistemology is its growing
theoretical emphasis upon various notions of context. The present paper
addresses the connections between knowledge and context within a formal
approach. To this end, a “contextual epistemic logic”, CEL, is proposed,
which consists of an extension of standard S5 epistemic modal logic with
appropriate reduction axioms to deal with an extra contextual operator.
We describe the axiomatics and supply both a Kripkean and a dialogical
semantics for CEL. An illustration of how it may fruitfully be applied to
informal epistemological matters is provided.
1 Introduction
The formal approach to knowledge and context that we propose in this paper was
originally driven not only by formal logical concerns but also by more informal
epistemological concerns.
In the last two or three decades, indeed, epistemology has seen two major
“turns”:
• a “new linguistic turn”, as Ludlow [21] calls it, through the increased re-
liance, in contemporary epistemological debates, upon “evidence” regard-
ing how we ordinarily talk about knowledge, most notably as a result
of the flourishing discussions about the purported epistemological role of
various notions of context and the relative merits of “contextualism” over
“scepticism”, “anti-scepticism”, and “subjectivism”, inter alia;
• a “logical turn”, through the rising conviction that discussions in infor-
mal epistemology may benefit from formal epistemology – epistemic logic,
formal learning theory, belief revision, and so on –, notably by applying
the methods of epistemic logic in order to gain insights into traditional
informal epistemological issues. Recent work by van Benthem [3], Hen-
dricks [14, 15] and Hendricks & Pritchard [16], and Stalnaker [32] count
as representative of this trend.
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An important part of the background for the present paper consists of the
project of taking advantage of the logical turn in order to record some of the
main lessons to be drawn from the linguistic turn of epistemology, the acknowl-
edgement of the possible epistemological role of context to start with.
This paper, at the junction of informal and formal epistemology, focuses on
the question how to introduce the notion of context into epistemic logic. It
provides a new logic, contextual epistemic logic (CEL), an extension of standard
S5 epistemic modal logic with appropriate reduction axioms to deal with an
extra contextual operator.
In section 2 contemporary informal epistemological discussions over context
are briefly exposed, as well as three strategies available to handle context in a
formal way. The authors already studied one of them in [20] and the other two
seem quite natural, one of which is accounted for in the present paper. The
section ends with a presentation of public announcement logic (PAL), which
is technically very close to CEL yet very different from it in spirit: after a
comparison of the respective objectives of the two logics we mention what must
be changed in PAL to reach a logic for contexts.
In section 3 the syntax and Kripke semantics of CEL are given, and a com-
plete proof system. In the subsequent section, we present a dialogical version
of CEL: after a general presentation of dialogical logic for (multi-)S5 modal
systems, we add context relativization and prove its completeness.
Finally, in section 5 we provide a connection between our formal definitions
and standard epistemological positions (scepticism and anti-scepticism, contex-
tualism, subjectivism), and we show a few applications of CEL to specifically
epistemological questions.
2 Contextual Epistemology
2.1 From an informal approach to knowledge and con-
text...
Constitutive of the linguistic turn in epistemology is contextualism. Contextu-
alism can be viewed as an attempt to reconcile scepticism and anti-scepticism,
and subjectivism as an alternative to contextualism. All these positions are
better thought of as positions about what a satisfactory account for the truth of
knowledge sentences like “i knows that ϕ” or “i does not know that ϕ”must look
like. A way of representing what it takes for a knowledge sentence to be true
is by means of an “epistemic relevance set”, i.e. a set of “epistemically relevant
counter-possibilities” that an agent must be able to rule out, given the evidence
available to him, for it to be true that he knows a proposition.
Thus, according to scepticism – also called “sceptical invariantism”, and de-
fended by Unger [34] for instance – the epistemic standards are so extraordinarily
stringent that for any (contingent) proposition, all logical counter-possibilities
to this proposition will count as epistemically relevant. That is, for it to be true
that an agent i knows a proposition ϕ, i must rule out the entire set of logical
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possibilities in which not-ϕ; this being an unfulfillable task for any i and ϕ, it
is never true that anyone knows anything except, perhaps, necessary truths.1
On the contrary, for anti-scepticism – also called “Moorean invariantism” and
defended by Austin [1] and Moore [23] – the standards for the truth of “i knows
that ϕ” being those for an ordinarily correct utterance of this sentence, they
are lax enough to make (a possibly important) part of our ordinary knowledge
claims turn out true: for any proposition, not all logical counter-possibilities to
this proposition will count as epistemically relevant. That is, it will be true that
i knows that ϕ only if i rules out a given (proper) subset of possibilities in which
not-ϕ.
Scepticism and anti-scepticism are absolutist views about knowledge in the
sense that for both of them, whether a logical counter-possibility to a proposition
is epistemically relevant or not depends only on what proposition it is that is
purportedly known and once this proposition is fixed, the associated epistemic
relevance set is not liable to vary. According to relativist views, whether a
logical counter-possibility to a proposition is epistemically relevant or not does
not depend only on what proposition it is; it also depends on the context, for
some sense of “context”.
For instance, according to contextualism – defended by authors like Cohen
[7], De Rose [8], Lewis [19] – the context in question will be that of the possi-
ble “knowledge ascriber(s)”. Although we’d better talk of contextualism in the
plural, a common contextualist assumption is that whilst the circumstances of
the purported knower are fixed, the epistemic standards, therefore the epistemic
relevance set, may vary with features of the context of the knowledge ascriber(s)
such as what counter-possibilities they attend to, what propositions they pre-
suppose, what is at stake in their own context, etc. In contrast, subjectivism –
also called “subject-sensitive invariantism” or “sensitive moderate invariantism”
– is defended by authors like Hawthorne [13] and Stanley [33]. This view has
it that such factors – viz. attention, interests, presuppositions, stakes, etc. –
are not the attention, interests, presuppositions, stakes, etc., of the knowledge
ascriber, but those of the “knower” himself. That is, the epistemic standards,
therefore the epistemic relevance set, may vary with the context of the pur-
ported “knower”, even if no change occurs in the circumstances he happens to
be in.2
1One might want to be a sceptic as far as contingent truths are concerned while not being
a sceptic with respect to necessary truths. Such truths include logical validities as well as
analytic truths. Taking the latter into account within a modal-logical framework can be done
by adopting meaning postulates.
2Absent from the foregoing discussion will be another prominent view on the matter, viz.
what may be coined “circumstancialism” – the view, held by Dretske [9, 10] and Nozick [24],
that the relevance set depends on the objective situation the subject happens to be in. The
reason for not discussing this view here is that one constraint on the formal developments in
this paper was to stick to epistemological views whose associated epistemic logics (1) were
normal, i.e. incorporating at least the principles of the smallest normal modal logic K – in
particular the Distribution Axiom and the Knowledge Generalization Rule – and thus (2) fully
characterized some class of standard Kripke models. This is not the case with circumstancial-
ism which drops the two K-principles just mentioned. However, capturing circumstancialist
epistemic logic semantically can be done in several ways compatible with a modal approach,
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So, depending on whether one opts for an absolutist or a relativist view
about knowledge, one will assume that a notion of context has an epistemologi-
cal role to play or not. A first incursion into formalizing the possible connections
between knowledge and context and the four epistemological views3 was under-
taken in [20].
2.2 ... to formal approaches to reasoning about knowledge
and context
The role of context in the above epistemological discussion is to impose a restric-
tion of the relevant set of possible worlds – not to go from a possible world to
another one. Contexts in a modal formalization thus cannot simply be reduced
to standard modalities.
As a consequence, in order to represent contexts in epistemic logic three
ways seem available:
1. use non-standard models, i.e. put the context in the metalanguage and
evaluate each (standard epistemic) formula relatively to some world and
context;
2. use standard models with standard modality, within an extension from
basic modal logic;
3. use standard models with a non-standard interpretation for context modal-
ities.
The first option, investigated in [20], requires that the notion of context enter
the metalanguage and that the formulas of the object-language be interpreted
in “contextual models”. The second track would require a kind of hybrid logic
to account for the intersection of two accessibility relations. In the remainder
of the subsection we briefly discuss the first two approaches before focusing on
the third strategy.
two of the most straightforward being (1) by adding “awareness functions” into the standard
possible worlds models as in [11], (2) or by augmenting such models with “impossible possible
worlds” as in [28]. Another important epistemological view is the “assessment sensitivity”
(sometimes called “relativist”) view, held by MacFarlane [22] and Richard [30] for instance,
according to which the relevance set depends neither on the subject’s situation or context nor
on the attributor’s context, but on the context in which a knowledge claim made by an at-
tributor about a subject is being assessed for truth or falsity. For the same reason as before it
will not be discussed here, since formalizing it would require reliance on a semantics allowing
formulas to be evaluated not only relative to a world, but also to both a context of attribution
and a context of assessment – i.e. a non-standard semantics, perhaps in the vicinity of [6]’s
“token semantics”. These issues will not be pursued here.
3It may appear to some that scepticism does not seem to be a respectable language game
with a special knowledge operator, but a defective language game with a respectable knowl-
edge operator. This seems intuitively correct, of course. So why bother trying to capture
scepticism in a formal framework anyway? Here are two reasons. First, the intuition in ques-
tion might simply be an effect of a prejudice against scepticism and thus cannot be appealed
to in support of a depreciative view of scepticism without begging the question; second, our
committment is to find a formal framework that makes everything “respectable” in each of
the epistemological positions it is meant to capture: we want both their respective “language
game” and “knowledge operator” to be treated as “respectable”.
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2.2.1 Contextual models
Formalizing contexts while sticking to the standard syntax of epistemic logic
implies the adoption of non-standard models. Contextual models are usual
Kripke models for multi-S5 epistemic languages M = 〈W, {Ki}i∈I,V〉 augmented
with a pair 〈C,R〉, where: C =
{
c j : j ∈ J
}
, ∅ is a set of “contexts”, for I ⊆ J,4
and R : C → (W → ℘(W)) is a function of “contextual relevance” associating
with each context c j, for each world w, the set R(c j)(w) of worlds relevant in
that context at that world.
Truth in contextual models is then defined relatively to a world and a con-
text. The clauses are the usual ones for propositional connectives in the sense
that contexts do not play any role on them, whereas contexts can modify the
evaluation of epistemic operators in one of the following four ways:
M, ci,w  K jϕ iff
(1.1) for all w′, if K jww
′ and w′ ∈ R(ci)(w), then M, ci,w
′
 ϕ.
(1.2) for all w′, if K jww
′ and w′ ∈ R(ci)(w), then M, c j,w
′
 ϕ.
(2.1) for all w′, if K jww
′ and w′ ∈ R(c j)(w), then M, ci,w
′
 ϕ.
(2.2) for all w′, if K jww
′ and w′ ∈ R(c j)(w), then M, c j,w
′
 ϕ.
The definitions lead to four different logics, i.e. to four interpretations of the
epistemic operator K j.
Taking epistemic accessibility relations to be equivalence relations, a formal
characterization of the aforementioned informal views of knowledge can be given
through a proper choice among the four cases (1.1)–(2.2) or/and through proper
restrictions on the contextual relevance function. The two absolutist views of
knowledge – scepticism and anti-scepticism – can thus be associated with case
(1.1), differing from each other only in their respective restrictions on R, viz.
the restriction that for all i and w, R(ci)(w) = W for scepticism – hence a
restriction enabling scepticism to drop the condition w′ ∈ R(ci)(w) from the
truth conditions of epistemic sentences – and the minimal restriction that for
all i and w, R(ci)(w) ( W for anti-scepticism. In contrast, the two relativist
views of knowledge can be associated with the (–.2) cases, viz. case (1.2) for
contextualism and case (2.2) for subjectivism.5
Within this framework one can express truth-in-a-context for knowledge
claims – an interesting result for contemporary informal epistemology whose
interest in the connection between knowledge and context lies primarily in the
4A context ci is thus assigned to every agent i ∈ I, but additional contexts may be added
for groups of agents, conversations, and so forth.
5A possible worry with these formal definitions is that they end up making scepticism look
like a limiting case of anti-scepticism and the characterisation of the latter unsatisfactory for
anyone interested in a more substantial definition. But first, what we were after was more
to contrast absolutist with relativist views than to contrast scepticism with anti-scepticism.
Second, the definition we gave of anti-scepticism – viz. “for all i and w, R(ci)(w) ( W” – was
meant to be broad enough so as to allow for more specific characterisations of one’s favourite
version of anti-scepticism. This can be done, for instance, by listing all the worlds one thinks
should be considered epistemically relevant, that is, included in R(ci)(w), or by providing a
general criterion for telling the worlds that are epistemically relevant from those that aren’t
(in terms of “the closest” or “close enough” possible worlds, for instance).
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issue of whether the truth of knowledge sentences should be taken as absolute
or relative.
Moreover, with contextual models one can account for the logical behaviour
of agents of a given epistemological type (sceptical, anti-sceptical, contextual-
ist, or subjectivist) reasoning about the knowledge of other agents regardless of
their epistemological type; that is, one can ask such things as If contextualism
is assumed, then if agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows that ϕ, does agent 1 know
that ϕ? One can also ask such things as If a contextualist knows that a subjec-
tivist knows that ϕ, does the contextualist know that ϕ?
However, despite its merits, the contextual models framework is unlikely to
win unanimous support from philosophers of language. For consider satisfaction
for epistemic formulas of the form K jϕ when epistemic operator K j is taken in
its (1.2) and (2.2) interpretations. In these cases, the epistemic operator K j
manipulates the context parameter against which the relevant epistemic formula
is evaluated: the truth of K jϕ relative to a context ci (and world w) depends on
the truth of the embedded ϕ relative to another context c j (and world w
′).
Now, Kaplan [18] famously conjectured that natural language had no such
devices as context-shifting operators – which he considered to be “monsters”.
So, if he is right, there can be no natural language counterpart for K j in cases
(1.2) and (2.2). Schlenker [31] and others have recently challenged Kaplan’s
conjecture, notably by arguing that natural language allows context-shifting to
occur within propositional attitudes. Nevertheless, the existence of “monsters”
remains controversial amongst philosophers of language, and the question of
context-shifting within attitudes is far from having been settled for that specific
kind of attitude reports formed by knowledge claims.
An advantage of the contextual epistemic logic that will be introduced in the
present paper is that it is immune to the charge of monstrosity: although some-
thing resembling context-shifting takes place in that framework, its language is
“monster-free” since its formulas are evaluated against a world parameter only
and contexts are of a purely syntactic nature.
2.2.2 Hybrid logic
The semantic intuition lying behind context-relativized attributions of knowl-
edge is that one has to restrict the evaluation to the set of the contextually
relevant worlds to check whether in this restricted set, the agent knows such
and such proposition. If one wants to go back to standard Kripke models and
wishes to handle contexts as standard (let us say, S5) modalities [c j], it is thus
required to consider the intersection of two accessibility relations: an agent i
will be said to know ϕ (at world w) relatively to a context c j – which can be
formalized by: M,w  {[c j]Ki}ϕ – if and only ifM,w
′
 ϕ at every world w′ such
that R j,kww
′, where R j,k is the intersection of the two accessibility relations.
Now it is known that the intersection of two relations cannot be defined
within basic modal logics [12]. One has to go beyond basic modal logic to express
sound axioms for context-relativized knowledge. Using the hybrid nominals νx
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and operators @x, we get the natural axiom schema (Pi being the dual of Ki):
[c j]Kiϕ↔ ((Piνx ∧ 〈ck〉νx) → @x[cl]ϕ), where 〈k, l〉 ∈ {i, j} × {i, j}.
Starting from Blackburn’s [5] dialogical version of hybrid logics one could
give a natural account of epistemic logic with standard contextual modalities.
This is left for another paper.
2.2.3 Model-shifting operators
The way followed in this paper has been paved by recent works about logics of
knowledge and communication. The idea, going back to [25], is to add model-
shifting operators to basic epistemic logics.
Van Benthem et al. [4] recently accounted for model-shifting operators con-
nected to public announcement. The idea is that the semantic contribution of
an announcement, let us say ϕ, is to eliminate all those epistemic alternatives
falsifying ϕ, so that a new model M|ϕ is obtained relative to which subsequent
formulas are evaluated. In this approach, context modalities are clearly not
usual modalities.
In the present paper, we propose to use this Public Announcement Logic
(PAL) with the required modifications. Before going further into details, let
us just add that a frame such as PAL can be combined with some dynamic
account of the context operators [ci]. Van Benthem et al.’s paper [4] provides
such a dynamic logic, using standard PDL with an epistemic interpretation. In
[20] the authors of the present paper accounted for contexts using a formalism
based on DRT. Anyway, the way contexts are handled (the dynamic part of the
formalism) is relatively independent from their role in epistemic attributions.
2.3 From PAL to CEL
2.3.1 PAL in a nutshell
The notion of a public announcement or communication is just that of “a state-
ment made in a conference room in which all agents are present” according to
Plaza [25], and that of “an epistemic event where all agents are told simulta-
neously and transparently that a certain formula holds right now” according to
van Benthem et al. [4]. The latter intend to model this informal notion by
means of a modal operator [ϕ], thus allowing for formulas of the form [ϕ]ψ,
read intuitively as “ψ holds after the announcement of ϕ.”
The language LPAL of PAL, the logic of public announcement proposed by
van Benthem et al., results from augmenting the basic epistemic modal language
L with operators of the form [ϕ] where ϕ is any formula of LPAL. The semantics
for the resulting language LPAL is based on standard Kripke models for L, and
the definition of  for atoms, negation, conjunction and knowledge operators is
as usual with such models. The more “unusual” feature of the semantics of LPAL
is with the clause of satisfaction for [ϕ], viz.:
M,w  [ϕ]ψ iff if M,w  ϕ then M|ϕ,w  ψ,
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where M|ϕ is an “updated model” consisting of a tuple
〈
W′,K ′
1
, . . . ,K ′m,V
′
〉
,
with:
• W′ =
{
v ∈ W : M, v  ϕ
}
,
• K ′
i
= Ki ∩ (W
′ ×W′) for all agents i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
• V′(p) =V(p) ∩ W′ for all atomic formulas p.
This appeal to updated models, obtained by restricting a given Kripke model
to those worlds where a given formula ϕ holds, is meant to capture the insight
that the epistemic effect of a public announcement of ϕ at a time t is that at
time t + 1, all the agents involved will have deleted the possible worlds where
they do not know that ϕ.
Our proposed formalism for reasoning about knowledge and context, al-
though it is strongly inspired by that for reasoning about public announcements,
does not appeal to anything like updated models and offers a slightly more com-
plicated semantics for the corresponding language.
2.3.2 Different means for different goals
Let us first compare the objectives of the two formalisms. PAL is specifically
designed to account for shifts of common knowledge following public announce-
ments. As a successful annoucement is made, its content ϕ becomes common
knowledge and the model is restricted to all and only those possible worlds
where ϕ is true.
The situation is different with CEL: here sentences are presupposed (and as
a consequence, known by each agent) as long as they remain implicit; when a
presupposition is made explicit – asserted, rejected, questioned. . . – it is removed
from the “context”. Such a context does not determine the set of epistemic
possibilities, but it determines a set of epistemically relevant possibilities.
For instance, in usual (non-sceptical) contexts it is assumed that b, “we are
all brains in vats”, is false; so ¬b belongs to the context. Now if a provocative
Sceptic enters the scene and asks whether we are sure that we are not brains
in vats, or, better, asserts that we actually are brains in vats, then the context
changes: b becomes epistemically relevant. It does not mean that b is true at ev-
ery accessible world / epistemic possibility, since such a “public announcement”
is not necessarily approved by all the agents; but b is now a (counterfactual)
possibility that needs to be rejected to grant knowledge.6
Hence the modifications of contexts according to CEL do not yield any mod-
ification of the accessibility relation: it expands or restricts the whole set of
possible worlds. Whereas PAL is concerned with changes of (common) knowl-
edge of agents, CEL aims at accounting for changes of knowledge attributions.
The contrast between the two theories is summarized in the following table:
6 As a simplification, we consider only literals as presuppositions; it means that an assertion
whose content is a complex proposition will modify the context by removing all the literals
occurring in it.
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PAL CEL
Explicit Implicit
Public announcement (Proto-)Context
[ϕ] [ci]
Any (complex) formula Conjunction of literals
What is a posteriori known: What is a priori assumed:
Set of epistemic possibilities Set of counterfactual possibilities
(“epistemically relevant possibilities”)
Restriction of the accessibility relation: Restriction or expansion of the set of
relevant possible worlds:
Removing worlds Removing or adding worlds
Knowledge shifting Knowledge attribution shifting
2.3.3 Consequences
PAL is useful to reach CEL for it provides a formalization of a logic with a
model-shifting operator. However, a few changes are required to adapt PAL to
a logic with contexts:
• Model-shifting operators [ϕ] of PAL are interpreted so that sizes of models
are systematically decreasing; in CEL, model-shifting operators [ci] must
allow increasing as well as decreasing sizes of models.
• Whereas the announcements of PAL are obviously linguistic, the contexts
of CEL need not be linguistic in nature; what is required is that they be
depicted by some linguistic sentence.
• The outcome of a public announcement for the agents’ knowledge is straight-
forward, as is the corresponding axiom schema of PAL. By contrast, sev-
eral kinds of subtle interactions between context operators and epistemic
modalities can be grasped in CEL.
As will be shown in the next section, these slight divergences lead to an impor-
tant dissimilarity at the semantic level: CEL semantics is much more inelegant
than PAL semantics. This will be a good reason enough to go over to the dia-
logical framework.
3 Contextual Epistemic Logic
In this section we first introduce the syntax and semantics of CEL, then a sound
and complete proof system. As was explained above, CEL is strongly inspired
by the model of PAL.
3.1 CEL: Syntax and Kripke semantics
3.1.1 Standard epistemic logic
The standard formal approach to reasoning about knowledge starts with the
choice of a basic epistemic modal language. This language Lm
K
(At) consists of
9
the set of formulas over a finite or infinite setAt =
{
p0, p1, . . .
}
of atomic formulas
and a set J = {1, . . . ,m} of m agents, given by the following form (F standing for
a formula of Lm
K
(At)):
F ::=At | ¬F | (F ∧ F) | K j(F).
This language is then interpreted in Kripke models consisting of tuples
M = 〈W,R1, . . . ,Rm,V〉, where: W , ∅ is a set of “worlds”; R j ⊆ W × W is
a relation of “epistemic accessibility”, for all j ∈ J; V : At → ℘(W) is a “valua-
tion”mapping each atomic formula onto a set of worlds.
3.1.2 CEL Syntax
In order to add contexts to basic epistemic languages, one can choose between
two equivalent notations (see [2]). For convenience – especially for the dialogical
approach – we will not use the modal contextual operator prefixing formulas
[ci]ϕ but a syntactic relativization of formulas: (ϕ)
ci. Moreover, each context ci
is characterized by a conjunction of literals (i.e. atoms and negation of atoms);
the “context formula” characterizing a context ci will be referred to by the same
symbol, ci.
7 So “context formulas” c can be defined as follows:
c ::=At | ¬At | ⊤ | ⊥ | c ∧ c.
We thus recapitulate the syntax of epistemic languages with contextLm
KC
(At)
(G standing for a formula of Lm
KC
(At)), built upon a set of contexts C = {ci}i∈I
(J ⊆ I, J being the set of agents):
G ::=At | ¬G | (G ∧G) | K j(G) | (G)
ci .
Formulas containing at least one operator K j are called epistemic formulas ;
formulas containing at least one subformula of the kind (ϕ)ci are said context-
relativized, and formulas being not context-relativized are said absolute. As is
immediatly seen from the definition, EL is a syntactic fragment of CEL.
3.1.3 CEL Kripke semantics
The contextual epistemic language Lm
KC
(At) is interpreted relatively to the
same Kripke models as Lm
K
(At). The satisfaction of atoms, absolute negations
and conjunctions is defined as usual. For epistemic operators and contextual
relativization, the semantics is a bit more complicated:
7Contexts need not be identified with context formulas; they can be partial models or
incomplete possible worlds for instance.
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M,w  p iff w ∈ V(p) (p being atomic)
M,w  ¬χ iff M,w 2 χ
M,w  χ ∧ ξ iff M,w  χ and M,w  ξ
M,w  K jϕ iff for every w
′ ∈ W such that R jww
′: M,w′  ϕ
M,w  (p)ci iff M,w 2 ci or M,w  p (p being atomic)
M,w  ((ϕ)ck )ci iff M,w 2 ci or M,w  (ϕ)
ck
M,w  (¬ϕ)ci iff M,w 2 ci or M,w 2 (ϕ)
ci
M,w  (ϕ ∧ ψ)ci iff M,w  (ϕ)ci and M,w  (ψ)ci
M,w  (K jϕ)
ci iff M,w 2 cx or M,w  K j(ϕ)
cy
where
〈
x, y
〉
is chosen in {i, j} × {i, j}
There are four different clauses hidden in the last one, depending on the
values of x and y. Each choice regiments a specific position about the interaction
between knowledge and context. We will refer to these four possibilities as
(1.1), (1.2), (2.1), and (2.2), sometimes adding an explicit exponent to the
knowledge operator – K1.1
j
, K1.2
j
, K2.1
j
, and K2.2
j
respectively – with the following
understanding:
M,w  (K1.1
j
ϕ)ci iff M,w 2 ci or M,w  K
1.1
j
(ϕ)ci
M,w  (K1.2
j
ϕ)ci iff M,w 2 ci or M,w  K
1.2
j
(ϕ)c j
M,w  (K2.1
j
ϕ)c j iff M,w 2 c j or M,w  K
2.1
j
(ϕ)ci
M,w  (K2.2
j
ϕ)ci iff M,w 2 c j or M,w  K
2.2
j
(ϕ)c j
Remarks:
– In the notation Ku.v
j
, the first superscript u corresponds to the contextual
condition, and the second one v to the context according to which the evaluation
is to be continued; the possible values of u and v are 1 for the current context,
and 2 for the agent.
– It is worth noticing that no restriction of the model M is required for the
evaluation of context-relativized formulas.
According to our definition the context relativization (ϕ)ci of a non-epistemic
formula ϕ is nothing but a notational variant for the conditional ci → ϕ. Since
such a relativization has no further impact on epistemic K1.1 formulas, the no-
tion of “context” carried by our formalism will appear to be non-committing
for supporters of absolutist conceptions of knowledge. However, this innocent
account of context will turn out to be sufficient to model contextualist and sub-
jectivist epistemologies. With CEL context friends and context ennemies can
thus be put together onto the same neutral field.
3.2 CEL: Proof system
3.2.1 Proof systems
There are several proof systems depending on the interaction between epistemic
operators and context. The differences are given through axioms of Contextual
knowledge. Each proof systems for CEL is that for multi-modal S5 epistemic
logic EL plus the following schemas:
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Atoms ⊢ (p)ci ↔ (ci → p)
Contextual negation ⊢ (¬ϕ)ci ↔ (ci → ¬(ϕ)
ci )
Contextual conjunction ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ)ci ↔ ((ϕ)ci ∧ (ψ)ci )
Context iteration ⊢ ((ϕ)ck )ci ↔ (ci → (ϕ)
ck )
Contextual Knowledge (
〈
x, y
〉
∈ {i, j} × {i, j}) ⊢ (K jϕ)
ci ↔ (cx → K j(ϕ)
cy )
as well as the following rule of inference:
Context generalization From ⊢ ϕ, infer ⊢ (ϕ)ci .
Like for the semantics of CEL, the schema for Contextual Knowledge can be
made more explicit through the following versions:
1.1-Contextual Knowledge ⊢ (K1.1
j
ϕ)ci ↔ (ci → K
1.1
j
(ϕ)ci )
1.2-Contextual Knowledge ⊢ (K1.2
j
ϕ)ci ↔ (ci → K
1.2
j
(ϕ)c j )
2.1-Contextual Knowledge ⊢ (K2.1
j
ϕ)ci ↔ (c j → K
2.1
j
(ϕ)ci )
2.2-Contextual Knowledge ⊢ (K2.2
j
ϕ)ci ↔ (c j → K
2.2
j
(ϕ)c j )
3.2.2 Soundness and completeness
As CEL axioms are reduction axioms, each CEL-formula ϕ can be translated
into a standard epistemic formula ϕ′ such that for every model M and world
w: M,w  ϕ iff M,w  ϕ′. Completeness of CEL axiomatics relative to the set
of formulas valid in the class Mrst of reflexive, symmetric and transitive models
is thus inherited from that of usual epistemic logic.
Theorem 1 For formulas in Lm
KC
(At), CEL is a sound and complete axioma-
tization w.r.t. Mrst.
Proof. From any CEL formula ϕ ∈ Lm
KC
(At), one can build a tuple
〈
ϕ0, . . . , ϕn
〉
of CEL formulas and reach a formula ϕ′ ∈ Lm
K
(At) such that: ϕ0 = ϕ, ϕn = ϕ
′,
and every formula (ϕm ↔ ϕm+1) (0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1) is an instantiation of an axiom
schema. As a consequence:
⊢CEL ϕ iff ⊢CEL ϕ1 iff . . . iff ⊢CEL ϕn−1 iff ⊢CEL ϕ′
Since ϕ′ ∈ Lm
K
(At), ⊢CEL ϕ′ is equivalent to ⊢EL ϕ′. Now, EL is sound and
complete, so:
⊢CEL ϕ′ iff Mrst  ϕ′ (i.e. iff ϕ′ is valid w.r.t. Mrst)
Hence in order to prove soundness and completeness of CEL, it suffices to prove
that for each reduction axiom schema: ⊢CEL ψ ↔ ψ′, one gets: Mrst  ψ iff
Mrst  ψ′. This obtains immediately by virtue of the definitions. 
4 Dialogical CEL
In this section, we present a dialogical version of CEL. We first introduce dia-
logical logic for (multi-)S5, then we extend it to context-relativized formulas.
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4.1 Dialogical (multi-)modal logic
In a dialogical game, two players argue about a thesis (a formula): The pro-
ponent P defends it against the attacks of the opponent O. For any set of
game rules DialΣ associated with some logical theory Σ, we will use the notation
DialΣ  ϕ to say that there is a winning strategy for the proponent in the dialog-
ical game GΣ(ϕ), i.e. if playing according the rules of DialΣ, she can defend the
formula ϕ against any attack from the opponent – owning a winning strategy
for a game enables a player to win any play of the game. The game rules are
defined such that a formula ϕ is valid or logically true in Σ (Σ ϕ) if and only
if DialΣ  ϕ.
The rules belong to two categories: particle rules and structural rules. In
the remainder of the section, we just give and briefly explain the rules for games
reaching multi-S5 valid formulas.8
4.1.1 Worlds numbering
The thesis of the dialogue is uttered at a given world w, as well as the subsequent
formulas. This world relativization is explicit in dialogue games: we will use
labelled formulas of the kind “w : ϕ”, like in explicit tableau systems. For that
purpose, we need a system of world numbering that reflects syntactically the
accessibily relation. We will use the following principles, inspired from Fitting
numbers for mono-modal logic:
• The initial world is numbered 1. The n immediate successors of w according to
the agent j are numbered wj1,wj2, . . . ,wjn.
• An immediate successor wju of a world w is said to be of rank +1 relative to w,
and w is said to be of rank −1 relative to its immediate successors. A successor
wjujv of a world w is said to be of rank +2 relative to w, etc.
So for instance, a play on a thesis “1 : KiK jϕ” can reach the following labelled
formula: “1i1 j2 : ϕ.”
4.1.2 Particle Rules
The meaning of each logical constant is given through a particle rule which
determines how to attack and defend a formula whose main connective is the
constant in question. The set, ELmPartRules, of particle rules for disjunction,
conjunction, subjunction, negation, and epistemic operators is recapitulated in
the following table:
8 Dialogical modal logics were first introduced in Rahman & Ru¨ckert’s paper [27]. Readers
interested by some more detailed account of both non-modal and modal logics should refer to
that paper. For a presentation of game rules close to the present one, see [29].
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Attack Defence
w : ϕ ∨ ψ w : ? w : ϕ, or w : ψ
(The defender chooses)
w : ϕ ∧ ψ w : ?L, or w : ?R w : ϕ, or w : ψ
(The attacker chooses) (respectively)
w : ϕ→ ψ w : ϕ w : ψ
w : ¬ϕ w : ϕ ⊗
(No possible defence)
w : Kiϕ w : ?Ki/wiw′ wiw
′ : ϕ
(the attacker chooses
an available world wiw′)
w : Piϕ w : ?Pi wiw
′ : ϕ
(the available world wiw′
being chosen by the defender)
The idea for disjunction is that the proposition ϕ ∨ ψ, when asserted (at
world w) by a player, is challenged by the question “Which one?”; the defender
has then to choose one of the disjuncts and to defend it against any new attack.
The rule is the same for the conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ, except that the choice is now
made by the attacker: “Give me the left conjunct (?L)” or “Give me the right
one (?R)”, and the defender has to assume the conjunct chosen by his or her
challenger. For the conditional ϕ → ψ, the attacker assumes the antecedent
ϕ and the defender continues with ψ. Negated formulas are attacked by the
cancellation of negation, and cannot be defended; the defender in this case can
thus only counterattack (if she can).
The particle rules for each epistemic operator Ki and its dual Pi (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m})
enable the players to change the world. They are defined in a way analogous
to conjunction and disjunction respectively, regarding the player (challenger or
defender) expected to make the relevant choice.
4.1.3 Structural Rules
In addition to the particle rules connected to each logical constant, one also
needs structural rules to be able to play in such and such a way at the level of
the whole game. The first five of them yield games for classical propositional
logic, and the last two rules regiment the modal part of epistemic logic.
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• (PL-0) Starting Rule: The initial formula (the thesis of the dialogical
game) is asserted by P at world 1. Moves are numbered and alter-
natively uttered by P and O. Each move after the initial utterance is
either an attack or a defence.
• (PL-1) Winning Rule: Player X wins iff it is Y’s turn to play and Y
cannot perform any move.
• (PL-2) No Delaying Tactics Rule: Both players can only perform
moves that change the situation.
• (PL-3) Formal Rule for Atoms: At a given world P cannot introduce
any new atomic formula; new atomic formulas must be stated byO first.
Atomic formulas can never be attacked.
• (PL-4c) Classical Rule: In any move, each player may attack a com-
plex formula uttered by the other player or defend him/herself against
any attack (including those that have already been defended).a
A world w is said to be introduced by a move in a play when w is
first mentioned either through an asserted labeled formula (w : ϕ), or
through a non-assertive attack (?Ki/w).
• (ML-frw) Formal Rule for Worlds: P cannot introduce a new world;
new worlds must be introduced by O first.
• (ML-S5) S5 Rule: P can choose any (given) world.b
aThis rule can be replaced by the following one to get games for intuitionistic
logic:
Intuitionistic Rule: In any move, each player may attack a complex formula
uttered by the other player or defend him/herself against the last attack that has not
yet been defended.
bOther structural rules could define other usual modal systems (K, D, T, S4, etc.).
See [27].
Now we can build the set of rules for multi-S5 epistemic logic (EL):
DialEL := ELmPartRules
∪ {PL-0, PL-1, PL-2, PL-3, PL-4c, ML-frc, ML-S5}
It is assumed that this dialogical system is sound and complete, i.e.:
DialEL  ϕ iff EL ϕ.
This is shown using strategic tableaus analogous which are similar to usual se-
mantic tableaus, after a reinterpretation of the players’ roles.9
4.1.4 Examples
Example 2 Let us consider a substitution instance of the Positive Introspection
Property (also known as Axiom 4): Kiφ → KiKiφ. As our dialogical rules
9The proofs of soundness and completeness of Dialogical EL are non-trivial. They are not
explicitly given in [27], even though a halfway point is reached there.
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correspond to S5, the proponent is expected to have a winning strategy in the
corresponding game.
O P
1 : Kia → KiKia (0)
(1) 1 : Kia 0 1 : KiKia (2)
(3) 1 : ?Ki/1i1 2 1i1 : Kia (4)
(5) 1i1 : ?Ki/1i1i1 4 1i1i1 : a (8)
(7) 1i1i1 : a 1 1: ?Ki/1i1i1 (6)
P wins the play
The numerals within brackets in the external column indicate the moves and the
corresponding arguments (here from (0) to (8)); when a move is an attack, the
internal array indicates the argument which is under attack; the corresponding
defence is written on the same line, even if the move is made later in the play.
Let us comment this particular play in detail. It starts at move (0) with the
utterance of the thesis by P at world 1 (PL-0). The formula is challenged by O
at move (1), using the particle rule for implication; at move (2) P immediately
defends his initial argument. O then attacks the epistemic formula at move
(3), and using the correlated particle rule as well as (ML-frw), he introduces
a new world, 1i1: in dialogical games the opponent is considered as using the
best available strategy; he thus jumps from one world to another as much as
possible, to prevent the proponent to use his concessions (atomic utterances) at
a given world. At move (4) P defends her formula using (ML-S5). Then in
(5), O attacks the epistemic operator introducing once more a new world, 1i1i1.
Now the proponent cannot immediately defend her utterance, because it would
lead her to utter an atomic formula (a) which has not been previously introduced
by O at 1i1i1. At move (6), P thus counterattacks (1) using the new world
introduced by O, asking him to utter a at this world (ML-S5); in (7) O defends
himself uttering a at 1i1i1: the atomic formula is now available for P, who can
win the play at move (8). As the opponent could not play better – actually, he
could not play differently than he did in this play –, this play shows that there
is a winning strategy for P in the game. 
Example 3 Now we consider a formula with two epistemic operators: KiK ja →
(Kia ∧ K ja). Here it is not enough to consider one play: after move (2), the
opponent can choose either the left or the right conjunct. Depending on this
choice, the remainder of the play will not be the same. So after checking that
the proponent has a winning strategy in plays where O chooses the left conjunct,
one cannot conclude that she has a winning strategy at all: it must be verified that
she can also systematically win against O when he chooses the right conjunct.
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O P
1 : KiK ja → (Kia ∧K ja) (0)
(1) 1 : KiK ja 0 1 : Kia ∧K ja (2)
(3) 1 : ?L 2 1 : Kia (4)
(5) 1 : ?Ki/1i1 4 1i1 : a (10)
(7) 1i1 : K ja 1 1 : ?Ki/1i1 (6)
(9) 1i1 : a 7 1i1 : ?K j/1i1 (8)
P wins the play
O P
1 : KiK ja → (Kia ∧K ja) (0)
(1) 1 : KiK ja 0 1 : Kia ∧K ja (2)
(3*) 1 : ?R 2 1 : K ja (4*)
(5*) 1 : ?K j/1 j1 4 1 j1 : a (10*)
(7*) 1 : K ja 1 1 : ?Ki/1 (6*)
(9*) 1 j1 : a 7 1 : ?K j/1 j1 (8*)
P wins the play
As expected, there is a winning strategy for the proponent in each case. The
formula is thus proved EL valid. 
4.2 Adding contextual relativization
4.2.1 Particle rules
The table below gives the particle rules for context-relativized formulas: the
rules follow the reduction axioms in a natural way. This new set of particle
rules will be referred to as CELmPartRules.
Attack Defence
w : (p)ci w : ci w : p
(p being an atom)
w : ((ϕ)ck )ci w : ci w : (ϕ)
ck
w : (ϕ ∨ ψ)ci w : ci w : (ϕ)
ci ∨ (ψ)ci
w : (ϕ ∧ ψ)ci w : ?L, or w : ?R w : (ϕ)
ci , or w : (ψ)ci
(The attacker chooses) (respectively)
w : (ϕ→ ψ)ci w : ci w : (ϕ)
ci → (ψ)ci
w : (¬ϕ)ci w : ci w : ¬(ϕ)
ci
w : (K jϕ)
ci w : cx w : K j(ϕ)
cy
Here again, we can give a more explicit version of the last particle rule depending
on the kind of the epistemic operator:
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Attack Defence
w : (K1.1
j
ϕ)ci w : ci w : K
1.1
j
(ϕ)ci
w : (K1.2
j
ϕ)ci w : ci w : K
1.2
j
(ϕ)c j
w : (K2.1
j
ϕ)ci w : c j w : K
2.1
j
(ϕ)ci
w : (K2.2
j
ϕ)ci w : c j w : K
2.2
j
(ϕ)c j
4.2.2 Structural Rule
There is only one structural rule to add to the listing of ML: the rule that states
which player can introduce a context ci, by asserting its characteristic formula
ci. The idea is that a context should not be assumed in any formal proof.
• (ML-frc) Formal Rule for contexts: P cannot introduce a new con-
text c in a given world w by playing w : c ; new contexts must be
introduced by O first.
The intuition behind such a rule is that a context can be any formula, including
atomic ones; so the proponent should not have powers regarding contexts she
does not already have for atoms.
Now we have the set of rules for CEL:
DialCEL := DialEL ∪ CELmPartRules ∪ {ML-frc}
Soundness and completeness will be handled after the following examples.
4.2.3 Examples
In the following two tables, we consider the validity of a contextually modified
version of positive introspection, where the consequent is evaluated relative to
another context than the antecedent. As easily appears through the games, the
upshot depends on the chosen position: the formula is valid according to (2.2),
but not valid according to (1.2).
Example 4 Using explicit exponents for operators, the formula to be played is
the following one: (K1.2
i
a)ci → (K1.2
i
K1.2
i
a)c j.
1.2 O P
1 : (Kia)
ci → (KiKia)
c j (0)
(1) 1 : (Kia)
ci 0 1 : (KiKia)
c j (2)
(3) 1 : c j 2 1 : Ki(Kia)
ci (4)
(5) 1 : ?Ki/1i1 4 1i1 : (Kia)
ci (6)
(7) 1i1 : ci 6 1i1 : Ki(a)
ci (8)
(9) 1i1 : ?K/1i1i1 8 1i1i1 : (a)
ci (10)
(11) 1i1i1 : ci 10
O wins the play
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After move (11), P cannot answer a for it has not been yet introduced by O at
world 1i1i1. The only possible solution for P would be to attack (1) to force O
to utter Kia at world 1, then to force him to utter a at 1i1i1. But she cannot,
since the opponent never introduced ci at world 1. So she loses the play. 
Example 5 Let us now consider the (2.2) version of the same formula:
(K2.2
i
a)ci → (K2.2
i
K2.2
i
a)c j .
2.2 O P
1 : (Kia)
ci → (KiKia)
c j (0)
(1) 1 : (Kia)
ci 0 1 : (KiKia)
c j (2)
(3) 1 : ci 2 1 : Ki(Kia)
ci (4)
(5) 1 : ?Ki/1i1 4 1i1 : (Kia)
ci (6)
(7) 1i1 : ci 6 1i1 : Ki(a)
ci (8)
(9) 1i1 : ?Ki/1i1i1 8 1i1i1 : (a)
ci (10)
(11) 1i1i1 : ci 10 1i1i1 : a (18)
(13) 1 : Ki(a)
ci 1 1 : ci (12)
(15) 1i1i1 : (a)ci 13 1 : ?Ki/1i1i1 (14)
(17) 1i1i1 : a 15 1i1i1 : ci (16)
P wins the play
Here the proponent has a winning strategy, thanks to the utterance of ci by O at
world 1 in the third move. 
4.2.4 Soundness and completeness
Theorem 6 Assuming that DialEL is sound and complete w.r.t. Mrst, DialCEL
defines a sound and complete dialogics w.r.t. Mrst, i.e. for every CEL formula
ϕ ∈ Lm
KC
(At), the following equivalence holds: DialCEL  ϕ iff Mrst  ϕ.
The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1: we use the reduction axioms
to translate CEL formulas into EL formulas, and assuming that dialogical logic
DialEL is sound and complete for EL, we concentrate on the axiom schemas of
CEL.
Proof. From any CEL formula ϕ ∈ Lm
KC
(At), one can build a tuple
〈
ϕ0, . . . , ϕn
〉
of CEL formulas and reach a formula ϕ′ ∈ Lm
K
(At) such that: ϕ0 = ϕ, ϕn = ϕ
′,
and every formula (ϕm ↔ ϕm+1) (0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1) is an instantiation of an axiom
schema. As a consequence:
⊢CEL ϕ iff ⊢CEL ϕ1 iff . . . iff ⊢CEL ϕn−1 iff ⊢CEL ϕ
′
According to Theorem 1, CEL is complete so:
Mrst  ϕ iff Mrst  ϕ1 iff . . . iff M
rst
 ϕn−1 iff M
rst
 ϕ′
Since ϕ′ ∈ Lm
K
(At), as DialEL is sound and complete, we have:
19
DialCEL  ϕ′ iff DialEL  ϕ′ iff Mrst  ϕ′.
Hence in order to prove soundness and completeness of DialCEL, it suffices to
prove that for each reduction axiom schema: ⊢CEL ψ↔ ψ′, the following holds:
DialCEL  ψ→ ψ′ and DialCEL  ψ′ → ψ.
Let us consider the axiom for Negation. We thus have two (kinds of) games.
O P
1 : (¬ϕ)ci → (ci → ¬(ϕ)
ci ) (0)
(1) 1 : (¬ϕ)ci 0 1 : ci → ¬(ϕ)
ci (2)
(3) 1 : ci 2 1 : ¬(ϕ)
ci (4)
(5) 1 : (ϕ)ci 4 ⊗
(7) 1 : ϕ 5 1 : ci (6)
(9) 1 : ¬ϕ 1 1 : ci (8)
⊗ 9 1 : ϕ (10)
O P
1 : (ci → ¬(ϕ)
ci ) → (¬ϕ)ci (0)
(1) 1 : ci → ¬(ϕ)
ci 0 1 : (¬ϕ)ci (2)
(3) 1 : ci 2 1 : ¬ϕ (4)
(5) 1 : ϕ 4 ⊗
(7) 1 : ¬(ϕ)ci 1 1 : ci (6)
⊗ 7 1 : (ϕ)ci (8)
(9) ci 8 1 : ϕ (10)
In both plays, the opponent could attack ϕ after move (10), but as he has al-
ready uttered the same formula before, and as the proponent can attack the
same argument several times, any strategy deployed by O will be turned back
as a winning strategy by P.
The other implications obtain similarly from the definitions. 
5 Epistemological Applications
5.1 Epistemological positions formalized
Dialogical CEL provides us with powerful tools for gaining insights into the in-
formal epistemological debate over the context-relativity of knowledge claims
presented in section 2. To illustrate this, let us first show how the four episte-
mological positions alluded to earlier – scepticism, antiscepticism, contextual-
ism and subjectivism – can be captured within our contextual logico-epistemic
framework.
In section 2 the four epistemological positions were introduced in terms of
the “ruling out” of “epistemically relevant counter-possibilities”, which it is quite
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natural to understand in terms of S5 epistemic accessibility relations. For if we
take it that Riww
′ iff agent i cannot tell w from w′ from all the information
available to him at w, we can read“i can rule out w′ on the basis of the informa-
tion he has in w” as “w′ is not epistemically accessible for i from w”. Moreover,
the appropriate epistemic accessibility relations must be equivalence relations,
for it is quite natural to think that a possible world is ruled out by a subject as
soon as it is not exactly the same as the actual world with respect to the total-
ity of the subject’s evidence or information, that is, if it differs, were it only in
a minimal way, from the actual world in that respect;10 and being exactly the
same as is an equivalence relation.
Now, the four epistemological positions are positions for or against the rela-
tivity of knowledge claims to a given type of context – relativity to the “knowl-
edge ascriber’s” or “attributor’s” context for contextualism, to the “knower’s”or
“knowing subject’s”context for subjectivism, and no relativity to any context for
scepticism and anti-scepticism. In order to capture these differences within our
contextual logico-epistemic framework, let us opt for the following conventions:
• When dealing with a contextual operator (·)ci, we shall take it that the
context ci stands for the set of formulas that are being presupposed or
taken for granted by the agent or group of agents i. So we shall keep in
mind that a context ci may be understood as the result or/and background
of a conversation between several agents – what they all take for granted
for the purpose of their linguistic interactions –, if i stands for a group of
such agents, as well as it may be understood as the result or/and back-
ground of an agent’s “conversation”with himself – e.g. what he takes for
granted for the purpose of his current reflections –, if i is a single agent;
• In general, (ϕ)ci shall be read as “it follows from context ci that ϕ”. In
particular, if (K jϕ)
ci can be read as “it follows from context ci that j knows
that ϕ”, it may better be read as “in context ci, j counts as knowing that
ϕ”, that is “given what is taken for granted by i . . . ”. Moreover, when
we have a formula of the form (K jϕ)
ci , we shall take it that the agent (or
group) i is to be called the “attributor”and ci “attributor i’s context”, and
the agent (or group) j is to be called the “subject”. On the other hand, if
we need to reflect on a cx, depending on whether x = i or x = j, we shall
speak of cx as of the “attributor’s context” or as of the “subject’s context”.
With these conventions in hand, we can now establish correspondences between
the explicitly exponented knowledge operators we distinguished and the different
epistemological positions.
10Two worlds may differ in numerous respects, and yet be exactly the same with respect to
the evidence (conceived of in internalistic terms) at an agent’s disposal. For instance, an Evil
Genius world would be very different from what we take our world to be, but as the sceptical
argument goes, in it we would have exactly the same evidence as we have in our world.
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5.1.1 Scepticism and Anti-scepticism
The two absolutist views – scepticism and anti-scepticism – can both be as-
sociated with the knowledge operator K1.1
j
, whose behaviour with respect to
contextual relativization was fully characterized by the following reduction ax-
iom in CEL:
⊢CEL (K
1.1
j
ϕ)ci ↔ (ci → K
1.1
j
(ϕ)ci)
This axiom says that for subject j to count as knowing that ϕ in attributor
i’s context ci, it must follow from this context that j knows that ϕ holds in
that same context. So it is always the very same attributor’s context against
which an agent will count as knowing something. This is precisely what the two
absolutist views about knowledge claims have in common: epistemic standards
and relevance sets are not contextually variable but constant matters. The
only difference between scepticism and anti-scepticism is that for the former
the epistemic standards are too stringent to ever be met while for the latter
they are lax enough to be met very often and possibly most of the time. So,
the appropriate translation from the informal sceptic/anti-sceptic talk into the
formal K1.1
j
talk simply consists in substituting the appropriate contexts – cscep
and canti respectively – for ci in the axiom above, and in adding the following
condition:
canti → cscep,
but not vice versa. This is the most minimal way to capture the idea that
while canti excludes all the far-fetched possibilities arising from radical sceptical
concerns and encapsulates a rather large set of presuppositions shared by most
agents in their ordinary talk about knowledge, cscep excludes all such presup-
positions and encapsulates a rather large set of far-fetched possibilities.11 For
instance, the sceptic about contingent truths may not be a sceptic about neces-
sary truths and thus may take the proposition that 2×2 = 4 into his cscep, just as
the anti-sceptic has this in his canti; but whilst the anti-sceptic will also have the
proposition that he is not a victim of an Evil Genius in his canti, the sceptic will
not let this into his cscep. Actually, cscep can be identified with ⊤, which means
that context-relativization according to scepticism is no relativization at all.
5.1.2 Contextualism and subjectivism
Contrary to the absolutist views, the two relativist views, according to which
epistemic standards and relevance sets are contextually variable, fall under dif-
ferent knowledge operators. Contextualism is the view that the variability in
question is a variability according to the attributor’s context, not the subject’s.
11What we said in footnote 5 about the definition of anti-scepticism in the contextual model
framework holds mutatis mutandis in the current framework. One can work with the version
of anti-scepticism they favor simply by specifying what, according to their version, can be
considered the constant set of epistemically relevant presuppositions, that is, the constant set
of literals that constitute canti.
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It is thus natural to associate contextualism with operator K1.2
j
, whose behaviour
with respect to contextual relativization was fully characterized by:
⊢CEL (K
1.2
j
ϕ)ci ↔ (ci → K
1.2
j
(ϕ)c j),
for this axiom says that for subject j to count as knowing that ϕ in attributor i’s
context ci, it must follow from this context that j knows that ϕ holds in j’s own
context, that is, in the context whose attributor is subject j himself. So it is not
always the same attributor’s context against which something will count as being
known. Relativity to the attributor’s context is thus encapsulated in knowledge
operator K1.2
j
. In contrast, relativity to the subject’s context is encapsulated in
knowledge operator K2.2
j
, since the reduction axiom characterizing its behaviour
when contextualized was:
⊢CEL (K
2.2
j
ϕ)ci ↔ (c j → K
2.2
j
(ϕ)c j),
which says that for subject j to count as knowing that ϕ in attributor i’s context
ci, it must follow from subject j’s own context that j knows that ϕ holds in the
same context, that is, subject j’s context. We can thus naturally associate the
subjectivist view, according to which epistemic standards and relevance sets
shift with the subject’s context, with operator K2.2
j
.
5.1.3 What about the remaining operator?
One may ask which epistemological view could match the K2.1-operator. In our
opinion the main interest of this operator does not lie so much in its possible
correspondence with a view to be found in the epistemological literature as in
the means it would offer us to handle indexicality phenomena, for instance if
we wanted to incorporate personal pronouns like ‘I’ and ‘he’. Consider a true
utterance of ‘He knows that I am here’. To formally account for its truth,
we would need a knowledge operator whose logical behavior would match the
following equivalence: (KheI am here )
cI ↔ (che → Khe (I am here )
cI ), where
cI is the context of the agent who uses ‘I’ and che the context of the agent
refered to by ‘he’. Of course, we would not thereby have accounted for even a
bit of the great complexity of natural language indexicality, and it is not our
intention to do so at all.
5.2 Knowledge features uncovered
This formal translation of the four epistemological positions can now be ex-
ploited within our contextual logico-epistemic framework. In the remainder of
this section we will use dialogical CEL to illustrate how differences between the
four epistemological positions that have been pointed out in the contemporary
philosophical literature on knowledge can be recovered within our formal frame-
work, as well as to illustrate how differences that have not been touched upon
in the literature can be discovered through that framework. We will give four
such illustrations.
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5.2.1 Normality
One thing to note is that the three operators K1.1
j
, K1.2
j
, K2.2
j
, behave in the same
manner with respect to the contextualized version of the K axiom for knowledge,
viz.:
⊢CEL (K
u.v
j
ϕ ∧ Ku.v
j
(ϕ→ ψ)) → Ku.v
j
ψ)ci .
For any value of ϕ, ψ, u and v, this is a theorem of CEL and it is valid with
respect to the class Mrst of Kripke models with equivalence accessibility rela-
tions. Although it is a trivial result from a logico-epistemic point of view, it
is not from an epistemological one. One can tell from the literature that it
is important for advocates of the four identified epistemological positions that
knowledge closure under known material implication holds. This is crucial to
both the famous sceptical argument from ignorance and to the famous Moorean
anti-sceptical response to it. Even those who take it that knowledge claims are
context-relative admit that closure holds while insisting that it holds only within
contexts and not across contexts (see [19] for the contextualist case and [13] for
the subjectivist case, for instance).
5.2.2 Factivity (or not)
A more interesting result is that our framework clearly establishes a difference
between case (1.1) – absolutists – and cases (1.2) and (2.2) – relativists – with
respect to the contextualized version of the T axiom – call it (T)c:
(Ku.v
j
ϕ→ ϕ)ci .
For consider the following example of CEL-dialogical games for (T)c, where ϕ is
an epistemic formula:
Example 7 In what follows, we compare the factivity of contextual knowledge
according to 1.1, 1.2 and 2.2. In particular, we will check whether (K jKkp →
Kkp)
ci is valid or not.
1.1-version: (K1.1
j
K1.1
k
p → K1.1
k
p)ci
1.1 O P
1 : (K jKkp → Kkp)
ci (0)
(1) 1 : ci 0 1 : (K jKkp)
ci → (Kkp)
ci (2)
(3) 1 : (K jKkp)
ci 2 1 : (Kkp)
ci (4)
(5) 1 : ci 4 1 : Kk(p)
ci (6)
(7) 1 : ?Kk/1k1 6 1k1 : (p)
ci (8)
(9) 1k1 : ci 8 1k1 : p (20)
(11) 1 : K j(Kkp)
ci 3 1 : ci (10)
(13) 1 : (Kkp)
ci 11 1 : ?K j/1 (12)
(15) 1 : Kk(p)
ci 13 1 : ci (14)
(17) 1k1 : (p)ci 15 1 : ?Kk/1k1 (16)
(19) 1k1 : p 17 1k1 : ci (18)
P wins the play
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1.2-version: (K1.2
j
K1.2
k
p → K1.2
k
p)ci
1.2 O P
1 : (K jKkp → Kkp)
ci (0)
(1) 1 : ci 0 1 : (K jKkp)
ci → (Kkp)
ci (2)
(3) 1 : (K jKkp)
ci 2 1 : (Kkp)
ci (4)
(5) 1 : ci 4 1 : Kk(p)
ck (6)
(7) 1 : ?Kk/1k1 6 1k1 : (p)
ck (8)
(9) 1k1 : ck 8
(11) 1 : K j(Kkp)
c j 3 1 : ci (10)
(13) 1 : (Kkp)
c j 11 1 : ?K j/1 (12)
O wins the play
Short comment: After move (13) P would have to utter “1 : c j”; but this context
has not been previously introduced by O, so she cannot.
2.2-version: (K2.2
j
K2.2
k
p → K2.2
k
p)ci
2.2 O P
1 : (K jKkp → Kkp)
ci (0)
(1) 1 : ci 0 1 : (K jKkp)
ci → (Kkp)
ci (2)
(3) 1 : (K jKkp)
ci 2 1 : (Kkp)
ci (4)
(5) 1 : ck 4 1 : Kk(p)
ck (6)
(7) 1 : ?Kk/1k1 6 1k1 : (p)
ck (8)
(9) 1k1 : ck 8
O wins the play
Short comment: Here P cannot even attack (3): with (2.2), she would have to
utter “1 : c j”, which has not been introduced by O. 
What this shows is that absolutist contextual knowledge is always factive
while relativist contextual knowledge is not always factive. More specifically,
(T)c holds for relativist knowledge operators K1.2
j
and K2.2
j
when they bear on
“absolute” non-epistemic formulas, but not in the general case.
A precision is required here: There is a possible loss of factivity for contex-
tualism or subjectivism on absolute formulas, but this would be a trivial one
like the loss of factivity possibly occurring in standard multi-modal epistemic
logic: the formula K jp → p is trivially falsified at any world w
⋆ lying beyond
the scope of the accessibility relation R j where p is false. Analogous cases in
CEL are formulas like (K jp → p)ci , which are falsified at worlds where ci is true
while c j and p are false; but of course, ci is as irrelevant for the agent i’s context-
relativized knowledge as is the world w⋆ for his absolute knowledge. However,
the situation is different with epistemic formulas like the ones just evaluated
through dialogical games: here the context used to falsify the formulas is per-
fectly relevant to evaluate the agents’ knowledge, as is seen in the Figure below:
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p
*k
ck
cj
w0
w1
Figure 1: A counter-model to (K·.2
j
K·.2
k
p → K·.2
k
p)ci
To our knowledge this result that factivity for contextualism and subjec-
tivism is restricted to knowledge of the world (versus of other people’s knowl-
edge) has never been highlighted in the epistemological literature12.
5.2.3 Context-relativized introspection
Another first for epistemological discussions over knowledge and context is the
following difference between contextualism and subjectivism: if subjectivism is
true, what one knows in one’s own context, one also knows that one knows it in
anyone else’s context; whereas if contextualism is true, what one knows in one’s
own context, one may not know that one knows it in anyone else’s context. This
is clear from the dialogical games in examples 4 and 5 in the previous section,
which made it explicit that:
• 0CEL (K
1.2
i
p)ci → (K1.2
i
K1.2
i
p)c j
• ⊢CEL (K
2.2
i
p)ci → (K2.2
i
K2.2
i
p)c j
What this means is that for a subjectivist agent i – case (2.2) –, if it follows
from the context ci of which he is the attributor that he knows that p, then it
follows from any other attributor j’s context that he knows that p; while for a
contextualist agent, this is not true. This can be explained informally as follows:
• (Subjectivist case) If subjectivism is true, then for agent i to know that
p, he must meet the standards in vigour in his own context ci for knowing
that p. But he will then ipso facto meet the standards for his knowing
that he knows that p. For if he did not know that he knows that p, that
would be because he considers it possible that he does not know that p;
but he cannot consider this a serious possibility if he already knows that
p. And if i counts as knowing that he knows that p in his own context,
and since we are dealing with subjectivism, i will count as knowing that
he knows that p in any other agent j’s context.
12However, see Stanley [33] for a discussion of factivity and related matters in a subjectivist
setting.
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• (Contextualist case) If contextualism is true, then the relevant standards
for knowing a proposition may vary from one attributor’s context to that
of another. This being so, agent i may count as knowing that p relative
to the context ci of which he is the attributor, whilst not relative to the
context c j of another attributor j associated with more stringent standards
than in ci. In this case, since one cannot know what is false and since it is
false in c j that i knows that p, it is false in this same c j that i knows that
he knows that p.
It is an advantage of our formal framework that it can capture this informal
difference between contextualism and subjectivism.
5.2.4 Mixing agents
Another interesting feature of that framework is that it allows us to reason about
knowledge in a group of epistemologically heterogeneous agents and to answer
formally such informal questions as “If a contextualist knows that a subjectivist
knows this or that, does the contextualist know this or that?”13 Here we give
only one example we find interesting of that feature through the following ques-
tion: if an absolutist agent knows that a subjectivist agent knows a proposition
relative to a context, does the subjectivist know that proposition relative to that
context? In our framework this question becomes that of deciding whether the
following formula is a theorem of CEL:
(K1.1
j
K
2.2
k
p)ci → (K2.2
k
p)ci .
Now, this question is easily settled by means of the following CEL-dialogical
game:
Example 8 In the following example, we consider simultaneously agents of dif-
ferent kinds. The upshot is a kind of failure of Axiom T for an absolutist knower.
O P
1 : (K1.1
j
K2.2
k
p)ci → (K2.2
k
p)ci (0)
(1) 1 : (K1.1
j
K2.2
k
p)ci 0 1 : (K2.2
k
p)ci (2)
(3) 1 : ck 2 1 : K
2.2
k
(p)ck (4)
(5) 1 : ?Kk/1k1 6 1k1 : (p)
ck (8)
(9) 1k1 : ck 8
O wins the play
13Suppose that agent i is a F-ist (a sceptic, an anti-sceptic, a contextualist, or a subjectivist).
If i is coherent with his own theory of knowledge (ascriptions), which he intends to be the
only correct one for any agent’s knowledge, he ought to reason accordingly not only about his
own knowledge but also about other agent’s knowledge. This amounts to saying both that his
reasoning about knowledge ought to meet the subjectivist expectations and that he ought to
expect other people to meet the same expectations when they reason about knowledge. That
is our motivation for talking about sceptical, anti-sceptical, contextualist, and subjectivist
agents and for asking what they can know about what other types of agents know.
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Short comment: P cannot go on and attack (1), for it would require that she
utter “1 : ci”, which has not been introduced by O. 
Thus, the formula is not a principle of our contextual epistemic logic. This
comes as an amendment to, or better as a complement to what we said earlier
about the factivity of absolutist knowledge. For the lesson to be drawn from
this is, roughly, that an absolutist agent (a sceptic, an anti-sceptic) may know
something without this something being true when this something is about what
a subjectivist agent knows.
Incidentally, we may notice that the following formula, differing from the
previous one in that the subscripted agent is now the same for each occurrence
of a knowledge operator, is not a principle of our contextual epistemic logic
either:
(K1.1
j
K2.2
j
p)ci → (K2.2
j
p)ci .
Funnily enough, this could be interpreted in terms of “epistemically schizo-
phrenic” agents whose knowledge is compartmented in the sense that they know
different things when they are in a subjectivist or in a sceptical mood from what
they know when they are in an anti-sceptical or in a contextualist mood, or in the
sense that the subjectivist or the sceptical part of them knows different things
from what the anti-sceptical or the contextualist part of them knows. Then the
lesson to be drawn from the result in question would be that what your sceptic
or anti-sceptic compartment knows about your subjectivist compartment, your
subjectivist compartment may not know of itself.
6 Conclusion
Our primary goal in this paper was to investigate the relationships between
knowledge and context in the formal framework of epistemic modal logic. We
thus provided an epistemic logic with context relativization, CEL, together with
its dialogical semantics, and applied it to epistemological issues.
The subsequent results can be interesting both from a logical and from an
epistemological point of view. From the former point of view, the interesting
upshot is that the logic of public announcements can be translated into a logic
for context. The interaction between knowledge and context is slightly more
subtle than that of knowledge with announcements, but the result is really close
to PAL.
From the epistemological point of view, this time, the interesting result is
that CEL provides us with a powerful formal tool not only for capturing informal
views about knowledge and context, but also for gaining new insights into the
debates over their possible interconnections, contributing thereby to the current
research program in formal epistemology, at the interface of logic and the theory
of knowledge.
Let us just add that two typical“Rahmanian issues”came out from this work.
First, the dialogical version of PAL and its application to epistemology consti-
tute a new confirmation of the fruitfulness of dialogical logic as a framework to
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combine different logics. Second, we considered diverging agents mutually rea-
soning about their respective knowledge; this strongly echoes Shahid’s recent
work [26] about non-normal logics, classical agents reasoning about intuitionis-
tic ones. Of course, all our agents are normal (and even S5) knowers; anyway
as epistemologists, some of them appear to be strange, at least.
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